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Abstract
Our goal is to go deeper into the many writings on Behavior-Based Artificial Intelligence [Meyer
et al., From Animals to Animats, MIT Press, 1992] and to understand the interest—rather than
the mechanisms—of learning. Our intention is to study the complexity of the behavior of living
beings from a theoretical point of view. To do so, we introduce formal environments that model
the survival issue. Then we prove in this formal context that, many times, the extra cost imposed
by the conservation of information, even if it is relevant, is greater than the benefit of knowing it.
Consequently, in order to survive in our abstract worlds, one must manage his knowledge in a way
that fits the evolution of the environment. Furthermore, physiological observations corroborate these
purely theoretical results. Thus, we use these results to design a parallel system in which each module
manages its knowledge in a specific way. This enables us to obtain a virtual creature whose behavior
evokes that of a biological hen.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
We want to focus on behaviors which may seem quite natural for animals but which
prove rather difficult to simulate. Nobody is surprised when a dog does not behave the
same way towards people it is familiar with as towards strangers. However, no automatic
system is able to do the same at the moment.
Numerous works inspired by the observation of living beings enable us to increase the
adaptability of our computers. These include expert systems [15], neural networks, genetic
algorithms [26], and more generally research in automatic learning [21] that enabled the
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development of several applications such as automatic reading, optimization of shapes,
medical diagnosis or searching for petroleum.
The great complexity brought up by these works led to a more philosophical debate
about the very definition of “mind” and consequently about the mathematical possibility
to design thinking machines [23,24,27]. Of course, this question is hard to answer as one
of the major obstacles in the way of simulating adaptation abilities comes precisely from
the difficulties in defining them in a mathematical way. However, we consider it necessary
to have a theoretical framework that may lead long term either to an amelioration of our
technology or to proofs of its limitations.
As mentioned in the abstract, we strengthen results in the field of Behavior-Based
Artificial Intelligence [20]. Our aim is to set machines in situations that are as close as
possible to those of living beings. Our goal is then to study, using the tools of theoretical
computer science, problems that look like those that living beings have to solve.
Our main contribution in this area is to evaluate the a priori complexity of the behaviors
we try to simulate. This led us to introduce an evaluation method that is very different
from those usually used in the field of artificial intelligence (genetic algorithms [13] for
instance) but quite close to the one introduced in [18]. Indeed, if it is natural to think that
millions of years of evolution enabled nature to select highly optimized solutions, one must
also keep in mind that whereas machines are usually designed for a precise goal, the only
basic issue of living beings is to survive. This difference, which may seem to be anecdotal,
becomes important if the individuals have a life expectancy that is long enough to ensure
they will confront major changes in their environments. This is all the more true if, like
humans, their efficiency enables them produce these disruptions.
Our previous work [9] proved that it is highly probable that no reasonable machine can
memorize at the same time all the information used by evolved animals during their whole
life. But, the models we developed were too formal. The size of their memory was only
indirectly limited by the one of their sensors.
In the first part of this paper, we redefine and prove again several properties of our virtual
environments by introducing the memory cost. This will enable us to formalize the value
of a piece of information by establishing a relation between the hope for gain (of having
such information) and the cost of its conservation. The survival ability of a system can be
measured according to a criterion that looks like the notion of benefit versus cost. Next,
we test the performance of our algorithms in various conditions. Analogies between the
implementation of our formal creatures and several physiological observations constitute
the best proofs that our formal environments reflect some of the properties of the natural
ones they have been inspired from. For this reason, using a parallel architecture, we give to
each task a specific learning method. This leads to a new model of an artificial brain which
is developed in the second section of this paper. The conclusion follows.
1. Modeling environments and behaviors
As mentioned in the introduction, we will attempt to:
• define formal environments to model, as precisely as possible, some of the survival
issues living beings have to face;
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• design behavior algorithms that offer the best chances to solve those formal survival
issues.
From a theoretical point of view, parallel and sequential architectures are equivalent, as
regards the type of problems they can solve. More precisely, if it is possible to solve a
problem by using a parallel architecture, it will also be possible with a sequential one.
However, depending on the type of problem, it might be much easier to write parallel
algorithms and programs.
Let us take the example of a robot, given in [4]. To make things simple, let us assume
that the robot does not have to move. It just has to grab soda cans nearby and put them
down with an articulated arm. Brooks suggests that several tasks be executed in parallel:
• scanning for cylindrical objects of about the height of a soda can;
• serving the manipulator arm;
• moving the hand above sensed objects;
• using the hand sensor to look for objects of soda can size;
• grasping light enough objects;
• depositing objects.
“The individual tasks need not be coordinated by any central controller. Instead they
can index off of the state of the world. For instance the grasp behavior can cause the
manipulator to grasp any object of the appropriate size seen by the hand sensors. The
robot will not randomly grasp just any object however, because it will only be when
other layers or behaviors have noticed an object of roughly the right shape on top of
a table-like object that the grasping behavior will find itself in a position where its
sensing of the world tells it to react. If, from above, the object no longer looks like a
soda can, the grasp reflex will not happen and other lower-level behaviors will cause
the robot to look elsewhere for new candidates.”
Even though the very same behavior can be obtained by using a sequential algorithm, the
latter will certainly require more memory to be implemented. So, we will use independent
modules. Each module processes its own sensor set (which may be shared with other
modules) and implements a whole pattern recognition system.
Let us recall that our major contribution is to take into account the a priori complexity.
As shown by the following example, this process naturally leads to the problem of the size
necessary to implement the recognition organs: Fishermen know that fish are (quite) easily
fooled by lures that would be recognized by humans without any difficulty. So, we know
that there are physiological systems that will increase the identification abilities of fishes.
But whether adopting such systems would benefit the species is not at all certain! Although
such a hypothesis is hard to verify, we can assume that increasing the identification abilities
will also increase the size of the brain, hence the physiological needs. In other words, a low-
quality but cheap system may be optimal in a cost-benefit approach. Consequently, we base
our models on a complex evaluation of profitability, rather than on simple optimizations
such as those used in genetic algorithms.
An animal, even when it is resting, always consumes energy and has the urge to eat.
Consequently, its brain must allow it, among many other things, not only to catch prey next
to it but also to avoid useless moves. It can increase its chances of survival by decreasing
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either its errors, or its own energy consumption. We recognize an optimization of the
benefit versus cost, well-known by administrators. This led us to the following model.
The recognition organ of a formal creature receives information, coded by binary words,
from its sensors. These words are either refused (and the animal stays at rest) or accepted
(a reaction is triggered). The spending of energy is low in the first case and high in the
second. The gain of energy is always equal to zero in the first case but can be high in the
second, if the reaction was justified. Our model is designed to reflect this situation.
Definition 1. The formal model falls into two systems, the formal environment (or world)
and the formal creature (or animal), interacting according to an infinite loop:
Formal
Environment
Word w
Reaction r
Formal
Animal
The environment produces a word w of fixed length L and gives it a “taste”: “good” or
“bad”. Let us note that the same word can be produced many times but always with the
same taste. The produced word, symbolizing a stimulus, is sent to the animal. The animal
can react or not, modeling in this way the running of a recognition organ. The environment
updates the capital, c, of the animal that stands for an energy reserve according to the
following table:
“Good” word “Bad” word
React (α− γ )L− ϕM (−β − γ )L− ϕM
Wait −γL− ϕM −γL− ϕM
The parameters α, β , γ and ϕ are positive reals and M is the number of bits of memory
used by the animal. So even when it is at rest, our formal animal consumes a non-null
amount of energy −γL − ϕM that increases according to its memory size. Of course,
consumption is higher if the animal reacts to a “bad” word ((−β − γ )L− ϕM) but only a
reaction to a “good” word allows it to build up again the reserves necessary for it to survive.
Of course, the environmental program must be carefully designed in such a way that
survival is only possible for animals implementing an efficient method at a reasonable
cost.
In the following demonstrations, we introduce the parameters Γ and Φ and will define
the reproduction cost of the animal by Γ L + ΦM . This will enable us to formalize its
profitability. We will also introduce the set S of words our animal must react to. For this
set to be strictly defined, we will assume that after a finite amount of time, every word of
S will have been used.
More precisely, let us define f as the expectation (assumed to be constant) for a
generated word to be “good” and p1 (respectively p2) as the expectation for the animal
to react to a word in S (respectively S˜). The expectation of the variation of c will be ∆.
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∆ = f (p1((α− γ )L− ϕM)− (1− p1)× (γL+ ϕM))
− (1− f )((1− p2)× (γL+ ϕM)+ p2((β + γ )L+ ϕM))
= f (p1αL)− (1− f )(p2βL)− (γL+ ϕM).
A high value of p1 and a low value of p2 obtained with a medium value of M must lead
to ∆> 0. For instance, using f = 0.3, α = 4, β = 1.72, γ = 0.8, ϕ = 10−4 and L = 20,
survival is possible if p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.1 and M = 7000 but not if p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.1 and
M = 8000 or if, whatever the value of M , p1 = 0.7 and p2 = 0.3.
Now, we have to detail the formal environment and the formal animal algorithms. We
will show that introducing rules imposed to the design of the world and/or of the animal
enables us to simulate several kinds of environments that lay down very different adaptation
methods.
1.1. Formal creatures and formal worlds
1.1.1. Stable and foreseeable formal environments
A first concrete example of behavior concerns frogs. Frogs are known to recognize a
prey only by its size and movements [16]. Furthermore, if a frog is kept in a bowl with no
food other than dead insects, it will starve to death (even though a frog can physiologically
survive by eating dead insects). No doubt it is unable to recognize this unusual food
[16]. From our point of view, it means that frogs are unable to modify this behavior by
themselves.
If frogs survived using such a recognition method, it may be because the resource used
(alive insects) has been sufficient for a long time. So the species may have selected this
behavior by coding it into the genes.
This kind of survival problem will be modeled by a foreseeable and stable environment.
Foreseeable means that the program of the environment must be written before that of the
formal animal. Stable means that the frequency of the appearance of the words must be
permanent.
More precisely, a constant integer gi (respectively bi) is associated with the ith element
(in lexicographic order) of S (respectively of its complement S˜). Assuming f = p/q is the
frequency of “good” words (p  q), the sequence of words generated by the environment
(its history) is then computed by the following algorithm:
generate a (pseudo) random number k in the range 1..q;
if k > p then∣∣∣∣ generate a (pseudo) random integer r in the range 1..
∑
w∈S˜ bi ;
send the mth word of S˜, m being such that
∑
j=1..m−1 bi < r 
∑
j=1..m bi ;
else⌊
generate a (pseudo) random integer r in the range 1..∑w∈S gi ;
send the mth word of S, m being such that
∑
j=1..m−1 gi < r 
∑
j=1..m gi ;
Under these conditions, the designer of a creature has all the necessary elements to
determine the most profitable behavior. There is no reason for him to use learning. Let us
note that “the most profitable” does not always mean “error-free”:
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Theorem 2. Foreseeable and steady worlds exist in which all profitable formal creatures
make a few errors.
The proof uses the concept of minimality of a word [31]. Before defining it, we must
recall that a Turing machine with alphabet {0,1} is defined by its transition table which can
be encoded in a word of {0,1}∗.
Definition 3. A word of {0,1}∗ is said to be minimal (respectively algorithmically
reducible) if the shortest possible definition of a Turing machine producing it from a blank
tape is longer (respectively strictly shorter) than itself.
The word written by the algorithm:
Repeat 100 000 times⌊
write (‘01’);
is algorithmically reducible. Unfortunately, it is generally impossible to prove that a given
word is minimal [5]. So, no example can be given but the following result has been proved:
Lemma 4. Most words are minimal.
The proof is obtained by counting the number of Turing machines defined by a word of
a given length. See [5] for details.
Lemma 5. Let G be an integer, w a minimal word of length G and wa a word of same
length written from an empty tape by a Turing machine of length Ms < 112G. Under those
conditions, |{i,w[i] =wa[i]}| 13G.
Proof. Let e = |{i,w[i] = wa[i]}| and w∆ = {w[i] = wa[i], i ∈ [1..G]}. The word w∆
can be described as a sequence of words of {0}∗ (respectively {1}∗) terminated by a unique
‘1’ (respectively ‘0’). Using for instance a four letter alphabet encoded by {00,01,10,11},
we obtain two terminators ‘10’ and ‘11’ and ∀k > 1,2k words of length 2k. The 14 codes
‘10’, ‘11’, ‘0010’, ‘0110’, ‘0011’, ‘0111’, . . . , ‘010111’ with a length of less than or equal
to 6 are available for the 10 words ‘01’, ‘001’ , . . . , ‘000001’, ‘10’ , . . . , ‘111110’ and any
longer word can be compacted.
Now, if e  13G, each occurrence of a short word such as ‘01’,‘10’,‘110’ , . . . is
associated with an occurrence of a longer one such as ‘0..01’. Exchanging codes or
compacting long words, we save at least one character on the two words and w∆ will
be defined with less than 1112G letters. Consequently w, described with Ms + 1112G < G
symbols, is not minimal. ✷
Proposition 6. The number of 1s in a minimal word of length G is more than 13G and less
than 23G.
The proof is obtained when one applies the previous lemma to machines writing ‘0’G
and ‘1’G.
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Let " be a minimal word of length 220. We consider a steady world with L= 20, S =
{i," [i] = 1}, f = 0.3, α = 4, β = 1.72, γ = 0.8, ϕ = 10−4, g1 = 4× 106, ∀i > 1, gi = 1
and ∀i, bi = 1.
Proposition 7. In front of the previous world, a formal creature accepting only the
first word of S survives. Furthermore no creature recognizing S without errors can be
profitable.
Proof. By Proposition 6, the number of words in S is less than (2× 220)/3 < 7 × 105.
For a creature accepting only the first word G1 of S, p1 > (4× 106)/(47× 105) > 0.85
and p2 = 0. Moreover, as G1 is a 20-bit word, the boolean function w = G1 can be
implemented on a 64-bit memory. So, the expectation for the variation ∆ of the capital
c of the animal is
∆ = f (p1αL)− (1− f )(p2βL)− (γL+ ϕM)
> 24× 0.85− (16+ 64× 10−5)> 0.
By Lemma 5, an error-free method to recognize S requires at least a memory of
220/12 > 87380. For a creature implementing such a method, p1 = 1, p2 = 0 and the
expectation for the variation of c is:
∆= f (p1αL)− (1− f )(p2βL)− (γL+ ϕM) < 24− (16+ 8.738) < 0.
This completes the proofs both of Proposition 7 and of Theorem 2. ✷
As the world is predictable, we will give our creature a completely defined instinctive
behavior. We will not try to reduce its number of errors but to increase its profitability.
Remark 8. Despite the fact that foreseeable steady worlds appear quite simple, they can
lead to unsolvable problems. One proves this easily by replacing g1 by 1 in the previous
example.
1.1.2. Unforeseeable and stable formal environments
The following phenomenon has been observed [2]: A parasitic wasp (Anaphes Victus)
lays its eggs inside the larvae of other insects that will be used as food and protection by its
offspring. Nevertheless, the parasitic wasp must not lay an egg into a larva that has already
been tainted by another wasp. Indeed, in such a case, its offspring would be destroyed. In
the beginning of the laying season, the wasp probes a larva by plunging its stinger into it
in order to detect pheromones that would indicate that the larva is already tainted. It also
brushes again the larva with its antennae. Later, the wasp does not probe the larvae with its
stinger anymore and just brushes against it with its antennae to make a choice. We deduce
three things from these facts:
(1) The behavior of the wasp evolved. It learned to recognize the tainted larvae just by
brushing against it with its antennae. Obviously, it was not able to do this in the
beginning of the laying season.
(2) When its “learning” is over, the wasp is obviously satisfied with the acquired
knowledge as it never probes larvae with its stinger again.
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(3) Let us note that the wasp dies at the end of the laying season. This fact enables us to
think that the acquired knowledge is not forgotten while the animal is alive.
The fact that the wasp must probe the larvae by diving its stinger during its learning period
involves a lost of energy (and is time consuming). From our point of view, this extra cost
is justified by local or time-dependent variations of the environment. We think that these
variations prevent a general and lower cost method (just brushing against a larva) to be
genetically transmited to all individuals.
We model this kind of survival problem by an environmental algorithm that is stable but
unforeseeable. Unforeseeable means that the formal animal must be designed before the
environment and that the designer of the creature does not know anything about the “good”
or “bad” attributes of the words the animal will face.
Of course, a randomly chosen method may work but only if we are especially lucky.
More precisely, as the number of subsets S containing a given word is equal to the number
of subsets that do not contain it, the expectation for p1 and p2 are equal to 0.5 and the
expected variation of the capital c is
∆= 0.5(fα − (1− f )β)− (γ + ϕM)
which leads, with the previous choices, to a negative value.
So, instinctive behaviors can no longer be used and the only solution, if one exists, is
given by a learning formal animal that:
• collects information leading to experimental estimates of the gi and bi ;
• constructs a solution according to the previous values;
• uses this solution to work out its environment.
Remark 9. From a theoretical point of view, very good solutions (when they exist) can be
constructed by formal creatures using genetic algorithms [14]. In this case, the first step
corresponds to the construction of the evaluation function used in the second step to select
boolean functions. But this method requires a huge amount of memory and a very long
computation, hence an impressive initial capital which will not be made profitable until
after a long time.
So, from a practical point of view, the following bounded time learning (BTL) algorithm
seems to be more appropriate. It uses a database Mem of two sets (examples and counter-
examples) and an integer “distance” d between words:
{Initializing}read(w); accept(w);
while isgood(w) do⌊
read(w); accept(w){the capital increases while isgood(w)= true};
Mem[false]←w;
while not(isgood(w)) do⌊
read(w); accept(w);
Mem[true]←w;
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{learning}for t ← 1 to T do⌊ read(w); accept(w);
expected_value←[min d(w,w′)]w′∈Mem[true]  [min d(w,w′)]w′∈Mem[false];
if expected_value = isgood(w) then Mem[isgood(w)]← Mem[isgood(w)]∪w
{working}repeat indefinitely⌊ read(w);
if [min d(w,w′)]w′∈Mem[true]  [min d(w,w′)]w′∈Mem[false] then accept(w);
We have proved in [9] that, with any possible distance, the constructed boolean function
is error-free when sufficient space and learning time are allowed. Using specific distances
may shorten the database and hence the learning time. But if it is too sophisticated a
function will not be implemented in a short memory place. Of course, when it uses a
small memory and a short learning time, the behavior of the creature will not be error-free.
However, in front of a simple case, where there are small subsets U ⊂ S, U ′ ⊂ S˜ such that∑
w∈U gi∑
w∈S gi
≈ 1 and
∑
w∈U ′ bi∑
w∈S˜ bi
≈ 1,
this method provides a sufficient solution at a low learning price.
1.1.3. Semi-foreseeable formal environments
The behavior of bees illustrates a totally different learning method. A bee is able to indi-
cate to its hive the location of a large amount of food it has just discovered by realizing an 8-
path dance that indicates the direction, according to the position of the sun, the distance and
the size of the food source [30,32]. We conclude from these observations that a bee is able
to memorize the location of a food source at least until it dances when it is back in the hive.
Of course, we do not know if a bee forgets this piece of information, and, if it does,
when it forgets it. Just let us note that in order to simulate this behavior with a low-cost
machine (a machine that uses as little memory as possible), it seems quite natural to record
the new data over obsolete pieces of information (over the data that have been previously
recorded).
One should be aware of the differences between the two learning methods. On the one
hand, the wasp collects information during a short period. Then it seems to be able to use
its knowledge until it dies. On the other hand, the bee seems to be able to memorize new
pieces of information all its life. But they seem to be useful only during a short period
(until the food has been collected).
In order to simulate the problem of survival of the bee, which is very different from that
of the parasitic wasp, the environmental program must urge the creature to continuously
renew the essential knowledge.
Such a formal environment will be called semi-foreseeable, and must be designed before
that of the formal creature. Here is an example:
Example 10 (Cyclic environment). Let " be a minimal word of length 220. We consider
a formal world with L = 20, S = {i," [i] = 1}, f = 0.3, α = 4, β = 1.72, γ = 0.8,
ϕ = 10−4, Γ = 6 × 107 and Φ = 10. The words are selected by the following algorithm
whose main data are an array Ab of 200 booleans and an array Aw of 140 words:
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for i← 1 to 140 do⌊
Aw[i]← ith word (in lexicographic order) in S˜;
k← 140; l← 1;
repeat indefinitely
set 60 randomly chosen elements of Ab to true and the other ones to false;
j ← 1;
for i← 1 to 200 do
if Ab[i] then∣∣∣∣ write lth word in S;l← (l + 1) mod |S|;
else⌊
write Aw[j ];
j ← j + 1;
for i← 1 to 139 do⌊
Aw[i]←Aw[i+ 1];
k← k + 1 mod |S˜|;
Aw[140]← kth word in S˜;
Proposition 11. No (constant) boolean function allows survival faced with the cyclic
environment.
Proof. During each cycle, as 60 words of S and 140 of S˜ are written, the capital increases
less than 60αL − 200γL = 1600. As the price of a formal creature is greater than
Γ L= 12×108, the number of cycles needed before the investment can be made profitable
is greater than 12× 108/1600= 75× 104. From Proposition 6, we know that the number
of words in S and in S˜ are less than (2× 220)/3 < 7 × 105. As each cycle uses several
new words of S and a new word of S˜ , all the words of {0,1}220 are written and Lemma 5
applies. Thus M < 112 · 220 ⇒ (p1 − p2) < 23 .
Remember that the expected variation of the capital at each decision is:
∆= f (p1αL)− (1− f )(p2βL)− (γL+ ϕM)
If M  112 · 220 = 87380, ∆< 24− (16+ 8.738) < 0.
If 0 <M < 112 · 220, p1 <p2 + 23 and
∆< 24
(
p2 + 23
)− 24.08p2 − (16+ ϕM) <−0.08p2 − ϕM < 0.
This completes the proof. ✷
Let us note that this proof also applies to the bounded time learning method of our last
formal creature as it leads to an ad vitam æternam use of the acquired knowledge.
On the contrary, the following formal animal is a solution to the semi-foreseeable formal
environment.
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Instinctively memorizing formal animal. We now consider the following algorithm
whose main data are:
• base, a 16-bit number;
• others, a 420-bits long LIFO structure initialized to 0 . . .0.
repeat indefinitely
read(w);
if w = base then
h ←(w-base) mod 216;
if the hth bit of others= 0 or h > 420 then
accept(w) {to react allows to verify if w is in S or not};
if w /∈ S then
if others= 0 . . .0 then base←w {initializing};
elseif h < 421 then⌊
set the hth bit of others to 1
else
inc (base); put 1 in others;
while not(1 is got from others) do⌊
inc (base); put 0 in others
Proposition 12. The instinctively memorizing animal is able to survive in the cyclic
environment.
Proof. Let w be a word and n be the number of words in S ∩ [w,w + 420]. From
Proposition 6, we know that 140< n< 280.
Let us start our creature at the beginning of a new cycle. During this first cycle, it will
react to every word and especially to the 140 not in S. So, base is initialized to the
word that appeared first (which happens to be the smallest) and others is sufficient to
memorize the 139 others.
During the following cycles, all but the most recently appeared words not in S are known
and avoided. The most recently appeared one is mistaken and memorized. Let us note that,
after a few cycles, when a new word is memorized, base is incremented. So the oldest
memorized word is forgotten.
The main data of our algorithm need 436 bits of memory and it seems to be quite possible
to implement our formal creature on a 1024-bit memory. So during the first cycle, the
variation of the capital is equal to:
60αL− 140βL− 200(γL+ ϕM)=−3236.48
and during the following ones, it is equal to:
60αL− βL− 200(γL+ ϕM)= 1545.12.
So, an initial capital greater than 6500 ensures survival.
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With a cost of Γ L + ΦM = 1,200,010,240 and an initial capital of 6500, the total
investment of 1,200,016,740 is made profitable after 155,330,000 decisions. ✷
Remark 13. Increasing the number of bits in memory clearly increases the initial and
maintenance costs but does not reduce significantly the number of errors except if at least
87380 bits are used, allowing the creature to remember every “bad” word. So, it is much
less expensive in our cyclic environment to forget and to learn again than to memorize
every past event.
1.1.4. Unforeseeable and unstable formal environments
The above formal environments allowed us to model different adaptation methods.
However, compared to those of birds or mammals, they appear to be rudimentary.
From our point of view, the appearance of more and more sophisticated survival
functions in the biological world can only result from the confrontation with more and more
complex environments. So, we must now design environmental programs likely to impose
more complex survival algorithms. Basically, we tried to reproduce the inter-reactivity
of biological surroundings: In many cases, their fast evolution urges the living beings to
continuously readapt themselves. This race towards efficiency run by creatures becomes
in return the main source of the environment evolution. A well-known non-biological
example of inter-reactivity is the stock market. The use on a large scale of a system able
to foresee the stock prices would become the main cause of their evolution. Such a system
would render its own prediction null.
How to formalize this inter-reaction between the environment and its creatures? From
a theoretical point of view [9], the environmental program should have a memory size of
about 2L, which is not possible in practice. As a consequence, we will use an experimental
program that can be interactively modified by a human experimenter whose goal is to fool
the creatures. More precisely, we proceed this way: The environmental program has in
memory two sets GW and BW of “good” and “bad” words. It repeats the following loop:
repeat indefinitely
Choose a pseudo random taste “good” or “bad” with respective probabilities p
and 1−p;
Choose a random word in the corresponding set;
Wait for the answer of the creature;
Update its capital;
The experimenter observes the behavior of the formal creature and can delete or add new
words to the sets GW and BW. The only condition is not to add to a set a word that used to
belong to the other one. The main goal of the experimenter must be to “kill” the creature.
We stress that such an environment is, by definition, unforeseeable and unstable. It’s
obvious that instinctive or bounded time learning methods will not allow a creature to
survive. Anyway, we know [9] that programs exist using 2L bits of memory in which no
formal animal using only L2 bits can survive. So there is no safe solution to this complex
problem but we can look for a solution that offers reasonable chances for survival.
The following algorithm, which uses continuous learning, seems to be interesting. It uses
a distance (on which our theory does not give any information) to define nearest neighbor:
J.-D. Fouks, L. Signac / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 87–116 99
read(w);
compute the nearest neighbor w′ of w in Database;
if taste(w′)= good or too_hungry (according to a hungry level) then⌊ eat;
if taste(w) = taste(w′) then add w to Database;
if the memory overflows then remove the oldest word;
Driven by this algorithm, the creature accepts objects that are expected to be “good” and
rejects those expected to be “bad”. As long as no major changes happen in its world, its
memory provides sufficient knowledge to survive. Of course, from time to time, a “bad”
object is mistaken and accepted. Information on it is memorized and similar errors are
avoided in the future.
If its usual “food” disappears, the creature becomes hungry. In this case, the decision
process is inhibited and, little by little, even objects that are expected to be “bad” are
accepted. This allows the discovery of new kinds of food.
We have proved in [9] that with sufficient space and learning time, a boolean function is
obtained which recognizes a (may be strict) subset of S and which is sufficient to ensure
survival. Consequently, in a cyclic environment like the previous one, the memory will
actually overflow and the mechanism removing examples will be used. To remove the
oldest words from the database is quite simple but may not be optimal. In fact, obsolescence
is not at all an intrinsic property of words but is completely relative to what happens in the
future. So deciding whether or not an old piece of information has become obsolete appears
to be rather difficult.
However, if the environmental program stops regularly (to simulate sleep, say) the
following algorithm can be implemented at a very low cost. So, it can be considered
universal in a day and night alternation context which is the one of biological be-
ings.
function daily_learning∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
read(w);
compute the nearest neighbor w′ of w in Database;
if taste(w′)=good or too_hungry (according to a hungry level) then⌊ eat;
if taste(w) = taste(w′) then add w to Database;
end
function night_forgetting∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
foreach w in Database do
remove w from Database;
compute the nearest neighbor w′ of w in Database;
if taste(w′) = taste(w) then⌊
add w to Database again;
end
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In this way, the formal animal simulates during nights what would be its own daily
behavior if it had forgotten some of its memories. If this behavior remains correct,
memories are actually deleted. On the contrary, they are put again into the database. The
risk of making a mistake, which is equal to zero according to the animal knowledge, is
minimized. Furthermore, the learning and forgetting algorithms are almost the same: The
behavior responsible for the daily procedure can be reused along with the same software
to implement the night procedure of forgetting. So, the extra cost of this procedure is low.
From a theoretical point of view, we proved in [9] that this learning method delays the
database overload but does not avoid it. Consequently, a stricter heuristic for forgetting
must be used.
From a practical point of view, reusing the day hardware for the night forgetting forces
the actuators to be disconnected in order to avoid dangerous moves.
On this point, our algorithm simulates several characteristics of the physiological sleep.
Indeed, this falls into the slow wave sleep (SW sleep) and the rapid eye movement sleep
(REM sleep). While SW sleep seems to be devoted to the keeping of vital parameters, REM
sleep seems to be linked to learning issues [11,12,25,28]. REM sleep is distinguished by an
intense cerebral activity, that looks like the awake state, by rapid eye movements, and by a
complete atonia of skeletal muscles. Several researchers [7,19] suggested that it could be a
method for forgetting.
The fact that our theoretical processes converge on physiological observations is
noteworthy.
1.2. Experimental results
In Section 1.1, we defined several kinds of environments. Then, we proposed several
algorithms that have the best chances to solve the corresponding survival formal problem.
In this subsection, we implement most of our environments and algorithms. We test and
compare them in order to illustrate the results we previously proved.
In order to lower the simulation duration, the number of different words used is quite
low. Consequently, we raised the memory cost. Finally, the following parameters have been
used: f = 0.3, α = 4, β = 1.72, γ = 0.8, ϕ = 10−3 and L = 400. The words have been
represented by 20× 20 binary matrices.
Each experiment has been split into virtual days, and each virtual day is composed
of a 20 binary images sequence and of a night, used by the DLNF algorithm to manage
its memories. The plots are average values obtained with a population of one thousand
programs.
1.2.1. Survival algorithms implementation
Day-Learning and Night-Forgettting (DLNF). To implement this algorithm, the theo-
retical model (1.1.4) lets us choose a distance between the words and a too_hungry
function.
The distance used to compare two words is the following:
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function d(w1,w2)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s1:=number_of_1(w1);
s2:=number_of_1(w2);
if 10× abs(s1 − s2) > min(s1, s2) then∣∣ return 2(s1 + s2)+ abs(s1 − s2);
else
m1:=mass_center(w1);
m2:=mass_center(w2);
vector:=(m2,m1);
wt :=translated(w2 ,vector);
ws :=symetric_difference(w1,wt );
return number_of_1(ws);
end
The too_hungry function has been implemented this way:
function too_hungry∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
c1:=capital_at_the_beginning_of_the_day;
c0:=capital_at_the_beginning_of_the_previous_day;
duration:=number_of_seen_words_since_the_last_good_accepted_one;
proba:=(1.0− (c1 − c0)/max)/4.0×min(duration,30)/30.0;
random:=pseudo_random_float_number_less_than_one;
return random<proba;
end
Bounded Time Learning (BTL). The theoretical model (1.1.2) does not give any clue
about the distance to use and the duration of the learning period. We chose the same
distance as the one used for DLNF and set the learning period to six virtual days.
We also implemented algorithms (RS) specifically for some environments. They will be
described with the environments.
1.2.2. Implementation of formal worlds
Let us recall that a formal world is a program that produces “good” and “bad” words
and updates the capital of the creature it interacts with. The implementations of our formal
worlds use two sets GW and BW. A world produces a word by randomly choosing a taste
and an image in one of the two sets, according to the taste. The way GW and BW are
managed depends on the kind of environment we want to simulate. In a stable world, they
will remain constant.
1.2.3. Implementation of a stable and foreseeable world
Each of the sets GW and BW of the stable and foreseeable world SW1 is made of one
matrix (see Fig. 1).
The first algorithm that has been tested (RS1) has been specifically written for SW1:
102 J.-D. Fouks, L. Signac / Artificial Intelligence 133 (2001) 87–116
Fig. 1. Word of GW (left) and word of BW used by SW1.
Fig. 2. Results of RS1 versus SW1.
read (matrix);
if matrix(5,16)= 1 then accept(matrix)
One can see its results in Fig. 2.
The left plot represents the average value of the energy and of the used memory bits of
1000 programs. We can see that this algorithm does not use memory (it does not memorize
any image) and that it is efficient (its energy increases) as soon as it begins. The right
plots are the average proportions of words of GW (above) and BW (below) that have been
accepted by the programs. This algorithm never mistakes and only accepts all the words of
GW. Even if, strictly speaking, this is indecidable, the memory size of the program itself
seem to be minimal. As a consequence, its profitability can be considered optimal.
Results of the algorithm BTL are given by Fig. 3.
The template we used to plot the curves is the same. We can see that during the learning
period (six virtual days), all the words are accepted, and the energy decreases. Then, when
learning is over, only the words of GW (and all of them) are accepted and the energy
increases. The profitability of BTL remains correct even if it is lower than that of RS1.
The results of the DLNF algorithm are given by Fig. 4.
We can see that the learning method used by DLNF does not allow it to be profitable
before the tenth virtual day (when the energy increases). Its memory consumption slowly
goes up and becomes stabilized at 2 memories (800 bits of memory) on the twelfth day.
DLNF is quickly unable to accept words of BW, but it needs about 20 days to accept all the
words of GW. Its profitability is acceptable but, obviously, its much too complex learning
system is a handicap in a simple environment.
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Fig. 3. Results of BTL versus SW1.
Fig. 4. Results of DLNF versus SW1.
Fig. 5. Word of GW (left) and word of BW used by SW2.
In order to illustrate the fact that RS1 is too specific, we designed another stable and
foreseeable environment (SW2). It uses the two matrices of Fig. 5.
The following algorithm (RS2) is for SW2 what RS1 is for SW1:
read (matrix);
if matrix(5,7)= 1 then accept(matrix)
We also deem it to be optimal.
The results of RS1, RS2, BTL and DLNF in front of SW2 are given by Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. From top to bottom, the results of RS1, RS2, BTL and DLNF versus SW2.
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Fig. 7. The two words of GW (left) and the two words of BW (right) used by SW3.
BTL and DLNF behave the same way as in SW1. Of course, RS1 cannot survive (this
test illustrates the results of a predetermined decision algorithm when faced with an
unforeseeable environmental program).
1.2.4. Implementation of an unforeseeable and stable world
The sets of words used by SW3 are given in Fig. 7 (we used the same matrices as those
of SW1 and SW2).
The results of BTL, DLNF, RS1 and RS2 are given by Fig. 8.
Although RS1 and RS2 know a few of the words used by SW3, they cannot survive.
BTL easily survives and only memorizes three matrices (there are four matrices in SW3).
DLNF survives too but, as we saw for SW1 and SW2, in a stable world, continuous learning
is less efficient than bounded time learning.
1.2.5. Implementation of an unstable world
Let us recall that, theoretically, to implement an inter-reactive world needs 2L bits
of memory. Nevertheless, it is possible to simulate such a world thanks to a human
experimenter that interactively modifies the sets BW and GW in order to fool the virtual
creature. But it is impossible to do this in practice when testing the same time one thousand
programs. So, we simply chose a few matrices by preliminary tests on a few programs
before doing the simulation.
The first inter-reactive world (IW1) begins with the sets GW and BW used in SW1. After
a few virtual days, the two sets are replaced by those of SW2 (Fig. 9).
The results of BTL and DLNF are given by Fig. 10.
Despite the fact that IW1 is quite simple, BTL cannot survive. On the contrary, DLNF
can survive in its environment thanks to a relearning period.
So, we tested DLNF, according to the same operating methods, in a more complex world
IW2.
IW2 initially uses twelve images obtained by rotating, according to six different angles
(k× 360/6 for k ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5}), the matrices of Fig. 11(a). After several virtual days,
these images are replaced by twelve others, obtained the same way from the matrices of
Fig. 11(b).
The results are given in Fig. 12 and we can see that the learning of new images is longer
than the initial learning. DLNF easily survives by using only four memories.
Our last inter-reactive environment (IW3) alternates every 175 virtual days the 36 images
obtained by rotating the matrices of Fig. 13(a) and the 36 images obtained by rotating the
matrices of Fig. 13(b).
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Fig. 8. From top to bottom, the results of RS1, RS2, BTL and DLNF versus SW3.
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Fig. 9. Words used by IW1.
Fig. 10. From top to bottom, the results of BTL and DLNF versus IW1.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Words used by IW2. (a) The two matrices rotated to obtain the six words in GW (left) and the six words
in BW (right) sent by IW2 during virtual days 1–50. (b) The two matrices rotated to obtain the six words in GW
(left) and the six words in BW (right) sent by IW2 during virtual days 51–200.
Fig. 12. From top to bottom, the results of BTL and DLNF versus IW2.
The results are given on Fig. 14 and we can see that it is necessary, but very fast, to
relearn the images of the first set when they appear again on virtual day number 350.
1.2.6. Conclusion
Algorithm SW1 SW3 IW
RS1 First – –
BTL Second First –
DLNF Third Second First
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(a) The three matrices rotated to obtain the 18
words in GW during days 1–175 and 351–450.
The three matrices rotated to obtain the 18
words in BW during days 1–175 and 351–450.
(b) The three matrices rotated to obtain the 18
words in GW during days 176–350.
The three matrices rotated to obtain the 18
words in BW during days 176–350.
Fig. 13. Matrices of IW3.
Fig. 14. From top to bottom, the results of DLNF versus IW3, the results of one creature that “died”, and the
percentage of “dead” creatures.
The similarities (1.1.4) between the behavior of our formal animal DLNF and that of
living beings prompted us to compare our results with those of human beings undertaking
similar tests. The tests were conducted over three days. We showed the volunteers three
sequences each comprising about 120 images over 15′. On the first day (the first sequence
of 15′) we used the images obtained by rotating the matrices of Fig. 13(a). On the second
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Fig. 15. Proportions of accepted “good” and “bad” words by humans facing IW3.
day, we used the images obtained by rotating the matrices of Fig. 13(b). On the last day, we
used the same images as on the first day. The average results are given by Fig. 15. Although
human learning is of course much faster, the plots (proportion of “good” and “bad” words
accepted) of Figs. 14 and 15 are quite similar.
Our models and conclusions are very different from those of several workers in case-
based reasoning [29] or neural networks [6]. Nevertheless, we ought to mention two lines of
thought which on some points are quite close to our own. In particular, both are concerned
with forgetting as a feature that increases the learning abilities and not as a biological
defect. Despite the fact that we have not used neural networks, our DLNF algorithm is not
so far from the network described in [1] which grows when it learns and shrinks when it
forgets.
As we did, [18] first deals with theoretical considerations and formalizes the problem.
The authors show that to forget a piece of information, even if relevant, may increase the
efficiency. But two main differences with these works can be noticed. We have proved that
a formal environment can always “win” as soon as it possesses a much bigger memory
than the creature supposed to confront it and that different formal worlds imply different
learning methods.
In our theoretical and experimental studies, we only focused on boolean survival
functions (accept or reject) that are the most basic possible ones. However, our results
showed that with some environmental programs, sophisticated learning methods are
needed for those basic functions to work. Finally, the relative convergence between our
conclusions and those obtained from totally different bases by physiologists make us think
that our formal environments reflect some of the properties of the biological world. From
this point of view, the Brooks model that does not take into account learning abilities for
its modules seems to be incomplete and may need to be updated. We will focus on this in
the next section.
2. Specifying a hen’s brain
In this last section, we will use a modular architecture to simulate the behavior of a
hen. Even though our system is inspired by the Brooks model, we wish to mention a
few differences. The main one is relative to learning. Contrary to the original Brooks
claim [3] but in accordance with our results, some of our modules will implement learning
methods. Another one concerns the relations among modules. In a Brooksian subsumption
architecture, the layers are organized in a bottom-up hierarchy. Higher levels can inhibit
lower levels outputs or suppress lower levels inputs. In our system, all the modules are
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equivalent. Each one computes its own current goal together with a priority level. At each
step, only the goal with the highest priority level is taken into account. Our architecture
may seem less natural from the evolution point of view, but we find it more general and
easier to implement.
2.1. General scheme
Like its biological counterpart, our artificial brain should be able to extract the main
elements from the pictures sent by sensors, then to recognize food, predators, youngsters
and adults, in order to drive actuators correctly. Of course, our goal is only to show how
different modules can use different learning methods. We are not aiming at a precise
simulation of a hen’s brain. In particular, the number of modules is far less than those
indicated by physiology. As shown in Fig. 16, our model processes the information
received from its sensors in three steps.
In the first step, the pixels are organized into cells.
During the second step, the components (food, predators, other hens, obstacles and
so on) of the scene are identified and a “long-range goal” is chosen according to their
positions. Our proposal is to use, for each organ, either instinctive reactions and/or
instinctive memorization like in foreseeable environments or learning methods like in
unforeseeable environments.
The last subsystem chooses a “short-range goal” according to the different goals and
obstacles and moves the animal towards it.
Fig. 16. General organisation of the brain.
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2.2. Segmentation stage
We consider this function as purely instinctive. So, our experiments do not strengthen the
numerous results previously obtained in the field of image processing [22]. However, the
analysis of a sequence being generally easier than that of a single picture, the segmentation
subsystem should memorize several scenes and should use them to detect moves or to
evaluate distances and so on. Moreover, the pattern recognition in previous views can be
used to help segmentation in those that follow.
2.3. Decision stage
As mentioned above, this subsystem is modeled by a collection of independent survival
functions. Each of them uses its own recognition method to identify the components of the
scene and to choose its goal. Those subsystems are given as examples of what can be done.
They are not based on biological results. We will enumerate the main ones below:
(1) The immediate feeding function, activated when something can be caught, recog-
nizes a “good” object from a “bad” one and chooses it as its goal. As a conse-
quence of our results, the only way to construct it is to use a day-learning and night-
forgetting abstract animal as the one described in Section 1.2.5. Let us recall that the
comparison function essentially depends on the environment. If one wishes to im-
plement it, the numerous methods developed over many years in the field of classical
patterns’ recognition can be used. Associative memory [17] appears to be especially
interesting.
(2) The delayed feeding function, activated when small (eatable) objects are detected,
puts the goal on the nearest one. To avoid unuseful oscillations, previous goals
refused by the immediate feeding function must be memorized. So, we construct
it by instinctive reactions and memorizations like in the case of a semi-foreseeable
world (see Section 1.1.3). The first line of Fig. 17 gives examples.
(3) The following functions imply the recognition of not only the “fellow creatures”, but
also their ages and attitudes. If most of them only use instinctive reactions, bounded-
time learning (see Section 1.1.2) seems more appropriate to design the function
allowing the recognition by a youngster of its mother. Finally, the recognition of
the members of the hen-roost may be obtained by using a day-learning and night-
forgetting method (see Section 1.2.5).
(a) The immediate nursing function, activated by a crying youngster, redirects the
immediate feeding one towards it (see Fig. 17, line 2).
(b) The delayed nursing function, activated when a youngster goes too far, puts the
goal on it (see Fig. 17, line 2).
(c) The aggregating function detects afraid congeneers and puts the goal on the
nearest one (see Fig. 17, line 2).
(d) The fighting function, activated by nearby “fellow creatures” puts the goal on it
(see Fig. 17, line 3).
(e) The running away function, activated when a prevailing “fellow creature” is
recognized or when a fight is lost, calls the default exploration function (see
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Fig. 17. From top to bottom: the feeding, nursing, and fighting functions, a hen avoiding obstacles, and a hen
trying to catch a seed behind a fence.
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Fig. 17, line 3). Let us remark that, in the case of a hen, this function is sufficient
to allow sexual relations.
(4) The protecting function, activated at sunset, drives the animal back home to its nest.
In order to do so, it manages a stack structure memorizing different points of the
territory identified by specific obstacles. The corresponding algorithm is:
if a point of the stack can be seen then∣∣∣ put the goal on it;delete the points of the stack above this one;
elseif the last point has just been hidden then⌊
add the obstacle in that direction to the stack;
put the goal on it;
else⌊
call the default exploration function;
Let us remark that to reproduce the behavior of a biological hen, this function is activated
also when a predator is detected.
(5) The default exploration function chooses a direction, near the current one that is free
of obstacles.
For each survival function, a specific maximal priority level is defined. This value is
affected to the goal when the corresponding activating condition is encountered. In order
to avoid erratic behavior, this goal’s priority level decreases slowly when the condition that
activated it is over. The highest levels are obtained:
(1) by the protecting function when a predator is detected nearby;
(2) by the protecting function when the light is down;
(3) by the delayed nursing function when a youngster is too far;
(4) and so on. . . .
2.4. Execution stage
This purely instinctive subsystem computes the moves according to the “long-range
goal” and to the information directly transmitted by sensors. So, our animal would be
able to avoid obstacles.
Examples are given on line 4 of Fig. 17.
But our hen would be unable to go around a fence (see line 5 of Fig. 17). Let us note
that biological hens may succeed in doing so but only after a lot of training [8].
2.5. Concluding remark
To completely simulate the brain of a biological hen with its millions of neurons seems
out of the range of present computers. Despite the fact that it uses far fewer modules than
what is suggested by physiological studies, our model would be very hard to implement
completely and particularly with regard to segmentation and motion control. However, as
shown by the experimentation of a simplified version in a synthetic 3D-world [10], our
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artificial brain would be able to look for food, learn to recognize patterns, run away from
predators. . . roughly speaking, to survive in its artificial inter-reactive world.
Conclusion
There is a gap between Behavior-Based Artificial Intelligence (BBAI) which aims
to model the general behavior of primitive animals and Knowledge-Based Artificial
Intelligence (KBAI) that focuses on (some special functions of) human reasoning.
By introducing into the Brooks model a specific adaptation method for each module,
we think that we contributed towards filling in this gap: Our creatures are able to adapt
themselves to unpredictable changes in their world. For instance, they can learn to
recognize new kinds of food when their usual one is gone. But we have proved that to
do so, they must also reproduce points which are often seen as biological defects: they
forget pieces of information and need to “sleep” during the night.
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